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New voices from the ship of fools 
A critical commentary on the renaissance of 'permissiveness' a  
a political issue 
JOHN PRATT and R ICHARD SPARKS 
Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand 
Abst ract .  Conventional 'left' accounts of'Thatcherism' have stressed the authoritarian nature of 
its political rhetoric. This paper suggests that convergences b tween the 'new' conservatism and 
more fundamentalist moral positions, meeting on the ground of obscenity and violence in the 
media, area relatively recent development, associated with renewed strategic concentration  
the question oflaw and order. Indeed, the libertarian right, in adhering to a utilitarian laissez-faire 
understanding of private pleasures, has presided over a positive proliferation of erotic and other 
gratifications. We argue that in the United Kingdom the authentic constituency of the 'moral right' 
is an increasingly socially marginal one, rendered progressively more so by the rapid development 
of technologies of communication and entertainment. 
During the winter of 1985-86 a cold, but in some ways familiar, wind began to 
blow again in British political life. 'Permissiveness' and its alleged partners and 
products - media violence, pornography, cultural corruption, connected to 
rising crime, street violence and a more general undermining of the social 
order - was restored to the political agenda. Indeed, from its effects in both 
raising these issues again and generating a series of responses to them in 
various aspects of public debate, it is a storm rather than a wind - with its 
epicentre situated firmly in the core of the Conservative Party• The chillest 
blast came perhaps from Party Chairman and weil known right winger Nor- 
man Tebbitt. Delivering the annual Disraeli lecture at St Stephen's Club in 
London on November 13, 1985, Mr Tebbitt argued that the 'trigger' of today's 
outburst of crime and violence lay . . .  
• . .  in the era and attitudes of post-war funk which gave birth to the permis- 
sive society, which in turn, generates today's violent society. . .  
• .. thus was sown the wind, and we are now reaping the whirlwind (Daily 
Mail, 14 November 1985). 
And his speech as been echoed by a number of other prominent Conservative 
Party members. Lord Hailsham, the Lord Chancellor, speaking on December 
4 
11, 1985, linked the 1985 riots in London and Birmingham to the 'wickedness 
pervading society'. He continued...  'It must mean something to us that at 
every level of public life the bottom seems to have dropped out of morality.' 
(Daily Mail, 12 December 1985). 
Meanwhile, Mr Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary, made explicit the 
presumed relationship between sexual violence and the media which is always 
implicit in this discourse. He threatened broadcasters with legislative action: 
Mr Hurd yesterday called for tougher sentences to be imposed for violent 
crimes and warned television broadcasters that if they failed to curb violence 
and sex on the screen the Government could introduce legislation to force 
them to do so. (The Times, 9 December 1985). 
The weight of presumption which allows this use of the simple conjunction and 
to connect the two (arguably somewhat distinct) clauses of the above sentence 
suggests that the language of cultural 'miasmas' emanating from the screen is 
well-entrenched. The only pre-emptive strategem open to broadcasters, under 
threat of legislation, was to set up their own internal inquiries despite their 
insistence that violence had (previously) been consistently a lesser ground for 
viewers' complaints than boredom or bad language (see The Times, 22 January 
1986, 23 January 1986). 
Given this background, it is our intention in this paper to provide an account 
of the particular course and content of this debate and the way in which right- 
wing critiques of 'permissiveness' in the United Kingdom have taken the form 
of periodic rallying points. We shall argue though, that at the present time this 
platform reveals a paradoxical rather than complementary entanglement, in 
their respective concerns for 'law and order' between eo-liberals (or New) 
and moral (or Traditionalist) conservative constituencies. Itsimmediate target 
has become the blameworthy character of the popular media (although, of 
course, this has been by no means the exclusive preserve of the Right through- 
out the twentieth century). However, the above representatives of an avowed- 
ly modernising, populist capitalist party are, in our view, clearly seeking to 
cage a demon of their own devising. What the prognoses and possibilites really 
are for the kind of moral policing that they infer should be on the political 
agenda are by no means clear. Indeed, it will be our argument hat this 
particular platform (at least in the context of the United Kingdom) is signifi- 
cantly at odds with the emphasis placed on liberalism and market forces that is 
to be found in New Right ideology. Precisely because technological develop- 
ments and their effects cannot now be regulated without massive intrusions of 
privacy and personal iberty, the traditionalist conservatives have become 
increasingly marginal to the prevailing political discourses and series of expec- 
tations that these have engendered (about .'personal freedom', 'choice', 'indi- 
vidual liberty' and so on). Equally, the fact that pornography is now an 
international industry which to a large extent puts it beyond the effective 
control and regulation of individual capitalist states 1 must seriously constrain 
the effects of any political intervention i this area. Simply 'turning the clock 
back' is neither politically feasible as a strategy, nor, we shall argue, is the New 
Right in the United Kingdom likely to make any serious attempt to do so. 
Despite the attention that has been given by some critical observers to what 
they see as being both the popular appeal and immediate consequences of 
traditionalist/fundamentalist Conservatism in the United Kingdom (see for 
example Hall et al 1978), we will argue that this particular strain of moral 
criticism from the Right, although vocal at present, comes from and is concen- 
trated amongst those sections of the population who feel out of touch with or 
out of place in a society undergoing major technological nd economic trans- 
formation. Rather than being major policy makers, they represent one of the 
least powerful political constituencies. 
There are two further points we taust address at this stage. Firstly, the 
location of out analysis is the United Kingdom; we recognise that elsewhere 
the issue of permissiveness and the Right is likely to and has taken a different 
course. Indeed, it does seem that the 'moral majority' has been able to make a 
real political impact in the U.S.A. (see for example, Gordon and Hunter 1978; 
Ray 1983; more generally, Ratner and McMullan 19832). Social conditions 
specific to the United Kingdom have taken this debate along a very different 
direction. 
And secondly, it is of vital importance not to conflate traditionalist con- 
servative opposition to permissiveness with the feminist critique of and politi- 
cal opposition to pornography. If there has been some apparent convergence 
in the past (cf. Taylor, B, 1981), it is clear that for feminists the issue of 
pornography has become the catalyst for a direct attack on the patriarchial 
relations of power between men and women which underscore and inform 
predominant sexual discourses (see, for example, Root 1983; Kappeler 1986) 
while at the same time seeking to preserve 
one of the most important women's gains in recent years; the recognition of 
their sexuality outside of the activity of reproduction (Taylor, I. 1981, p. 
201). 
At the same time, there are also some indications that, in the United Kingdom, 
the issues of pornography/violence and women's exuality is becoming more 
recognised at a popular level on these terms set down by the Women's 
Movement (see Winship 1985) - in addition to the various local forms of 
resistance taken by women's groups and collectives. Thus, while we see such 
forms of opposition as an emerging force, our concern is with the way in which 
traditionalist conservative opposition has become increasingly marginalised. 
At the same time, in coming to understand how and why this should be the 
case, we need to break out of the parameters of critical debate in which the 
issue of permissiveness and the moral Right is usually located. We shall now 
address what we see as being some of the shortcomings in the two prevailing 
modes of explanation to be found here. 
The moral panic and the repressive hypothesis 
The political statements we noted in the introduction brought back into the 
media limelight prominent representatives of the traditionalist Right in British 
society, the leading figure being Mfs Mary Whitehouse of the National View- 
ers and Listeners Association (who hitherto had largely faded from the politi- 
cal scene) 3. While at the same time the whole issue of sex, violence, per- 
missiveness and the like - and the supposed contribution of television in 
popularising these themes- has been raised again as a subject for more general 
media scrutiny and discussion 4. 
In some respects, there is nothing new in this resurgence of talk about 
'permissiveness' and its associated products and effects, nor from the political 
domains that this talk is coming from. Indeed, as a general issue, it has 
regularly been a part of the rhetoric of the Right of the Conservative Party 
since at least the mid-1950s (see Gamble 1974) and historically such periodic 
concerns and 'panics' over permissiveness and related matters can be traced 
back to the early days of Victorian society and beyond (see Williams 1961; 
Swinewood 1976; Pearson 1983). They have come be regarded as a metaphor 
for wider societal developments and social change (see, here, Wallis 1976). 
In another sense, this kind of debate, these quite deliberate and specific 
attacks on what are seen as the products of 1960s 'liberalism', is exactly what 
we might expect, given the anticipations and expectations of the critical Left of 
Thatcherism. We had been forwarned, of course, right throughout the 1970s of 
what might be on the political agenda of the Right in the aftermath of the 1960s 
liberalisation and reform measures 
Indeed, Stuart Hall et al. (1978) claimed that 'the kissing had stopped' by the 
end of the 1960s. 
From here on 
the backlash ad indeed begun. The silent majority were rallied by the more 
active of the moral entrepreneurs in campaigns to 'clean up' Britain (begin- 
ning, symbolically, with the BBC). Closer to the ground, the police were 
now goaded and prodded into action, especially over drugs, the alternative 
press, obscenity (Hall et al 1978, p. 253). 
And so this shift to 'the Right' - and all that this is understood to entail - 
appeared to gather force. By the mid 1970s we find the formation of 'an active 
authoritarian social gospel' whose ideologues included the Thatcherite section 
of the Conservative Policy, newspapers, journals and a more populist el- 
ement: 
the Clean-up Television, Anti-Abortion, Festival of Light campaigns, Na- 
tional Association of Ratepayers Action Groups, the National Association 
for Freedom, National Federation of the Self-Employed, the National 
Union of Small Shopkeepers, Voice of the Independent Centre, lobbies, 
who give to the new authoritarianism of the right considerable popular 
depth of penetration in the aroused middle-classes and petty-bourgeois 
sectors (Hall et al 1978, p. 315). 
By the time Thatcher came to power, the entire political climate, it seemed 
had been shifted quite fundamentally (in every sense of the word) to the Right. 
By this means - first, forming public opinion, then disingenuously, con- 
sulting it - the tendency to 'reach for the law,' above, is complemented bya 
popular demand to be governed more strictly, from below. Thereby the drift 
to Law and Order, above, secures a degree of popular support and legit- 
imacy amongst the powerless, who see no other alternative. And this leads 
to a sharp closure in the whole movement. Against his background we must 
speak, not only of the tendency towards authoritarian state, but rather of 
the production of an authoritarian populism. (Hall 1979, p. 1). 
This has entailed, apparently, a return to 'stone-age morality' and 'moral 
orthodoxy': a viewpoint still shared by some in the United Kingdom writing 
from this perspective (see Edgar 1983; Jacques 1983). 
Thus, in addition to the feminist perspectives we have referred to above, we 
are given two further explanations of these developments. The first subsumes 
them under the general rubric of 'moral panic'. But at the same time, this a- 
historical approach fails to address the specificity of the present panic. In our 
view this not only relates to the consequences and implications of important 
and widespread technological change but at the same time the 'populist base' of 
this panic has been undercut by the attraction of these effects and the political 
ideology of the New Right. In effect, then, it is not simply a reiteration of 
previous demands for 'morality', 'law and order' and so on from a static and 
homogenous social location. Insteatt, we will argue that this current renais- 
sance of interest in permissiveness hould be seen as the cri-de-coeur of an 
unpopular and redundant moral category: a collection of individuals and 
interest groups who appear to have no place in the probable projection of an 
electronically mediated expansion of private and public pleasures and indul- 
gencies. Il, hitherto, their domain has usually been populated by the petty 
bourgeois, we believe that it is not now a location that can be explained solely 
by reference to traditional notions of class. This may still be one of its unifying 
threads but there are likely to be others: such as age (too old to enjoy these 
new pleasures); health (too unfit, disabled or incapacitated to participate in 
these indulgences); and religion (too constrained by conscience or the con- 
fesion). But, notwithstanding such a wide range of sources and, indeed, the 
historical strength of puritan tradition within the British working class (see 
Moore 1985) our contention is that the sum of these fragments i likely to 
represent a "moral minority' rather than exist as a counterpart to the North 
American 'majority'. 
The second explanation has assumed the status of the orthodox critical Left 
position and is founded on the basis that there is some affinity, some effective 
alliance between the moral Right and the various other components of the 
New Right entourage. This we doubt. And, in addition, it also seems to us to 
be another version of what Foucault (1979) has termed 'the repressive hypoth- 
esis': that is, it assumes that there is some essential link between sexual 
repressi0n and the political Right; and more generally, that power is exercised 
in negative terms and is channelled through the modalities of law and the 
police. But to what extent have all the anticipations ofthis return to 'stone-age 
morality' been fulfilled? 
Are prohibition, censorship and denial truly the forms through which power 
is exercised in a general way, if not in every society, most certainly in out 
own' (Foucault 1979, p. 10)? 
Has it really been the case that all the everyday scenes, language, ideas and 
suggestions of eroticism - which this supposed commitment torepression has 
set out to curtail - have been closed down? And that the machinery of its 
economic and cultural infrastructure have been done away with? It is around 
these issues that we now wish to interrogate this conventional Left position: 
this means examining the legislative changes in this area since the first 
Thatcher government in 1979. 
Private and public policing 
To some extent, it can be argued.that the 1960s and 1970s aw a move towards a
model of private policing of the sexual and violent content of media. The two 
television etworks et up their own codes of conduct (BBC 1972; IBA 1973): 
and were followed by the attempt of the British Adult Publications Asso- 
ciation Limited to introduce a regulatory code for the 'soft porn' genre' 
(B.A.P.A.L. 1978). Similarly, the Williams Report (1978), on pornography 
and obscenity suggested a form of self-regulation for the outlet of such 
material. For example, sex shops and similar premises hould 
(a) refuse admission to persons under the age of 18 
(b) place a prominent warning sign by all access routes into the building; 
and 
(c) make no display available to persons not passing the warning notice, 
other than the name of the business and an indication of its nature. 
(Williams 1978, p. 160). 
Since then, there has been a number of legislative initiatives which, on the face 
of it, might sustain the tenets of the Repressive Hypothesis. This legislation 5 
has taken the form of 
(i) the Indecent Displays (Control) Act 1981: this established an offence of 
publicly displaying indecent material; 
(ii) the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982: local au- 
thorities were given the power to introduce a licensing system for 'sex 
establishments' and empowered to use the licenses to prevent he spread 
of such establishments moving from their traditional localities to sup- 
posedly new and untouched omains; 
(iii) the Cinematograph (Amendment) Act 1982: this required all local cin- 
emas to be licensed and introduced a new certificate ('restricted 18') to 
cover all film and video exhibitions6; 
(iv) the Video Recording Act 1984: each of the 6,000 video titles for sale or 
rent in the United Kingdom will be vetted for classification as being 
'suitable for viewing in the home' or not. 
Its specific task is to regulate recordings that are concerned 'to any extent' with 
the depiction of 'human sexuality', mutilation, torture or other areas of gross 
violence' or 'human genital organs'. 
There has also been an attempt in a private members Bill, introduced by 
Conservative M.P. Mr Winston Churchill, to tighten the control of public 
broadcasting (the Obscene Publications (Protection of Children) Amendment 
Bil11986). Although this did not eventually get on to the statute book, it might 
be thought, prima facie, that this and the preceeding legislation belong to some 
general moralistic rusade designed to redraw the boundaries between per- 
missable and non-permissable modes of pleasure and entertainment. I  is as if 
there has been a drive to replace self-policing with state policing, which Taylor 
(1985) goes on to argue marks an important regression from the Wolfenden 7 
principle of allowing 'freedom of choice' in the realm of private pleasures. 
Certainly, then, firmer boundaries have been drawn: yet at the same time, 
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we have to recognise that these new territories to be policed constitute only 
one fragment of the vast entourage ofeveryday sight, sound and expectation f
pleasure, titillation and excitement that is framed in and addressed through a
fange of channels of communication such as the media, fashion world and the 
general economic fabric and infrastructure of pleasure industries. What has 
been, or is likely to be the effect of the new laws on this more general terrain? 
It seems to us that they represent extensions of policing that are either: 
i) outside the boundaries of 'the normal' 
The 'video nasties' legislation isa good example of this. It has been estimated 
that only about 30 of the 6,000 video films available to the public (and about 
one in three homes in the United Kingdom now has access to video recorders) 
come into this category (see Robertson 1984), with the most notorious of these 
being I Spit On Your Grave, Driller Killer and S.S. Experiment Camp. But the 
point would seem to be that the 'apocalyptic character' (Taylor 1985, p. 44) of 
these latter three in particular may actually place them outside the mainstream 
of 'the normal'. It may only increase their notoriety rather than popularity and 
largely diminish any more general appeal that hey might have. Indeed, we can 
draw an anology with the popularity of certain kinds of pornography. Gagnon 
and Simon (1973), p. 263 contend that 
There are fundamental limits to the flexibility of the world of vicarious 
experience or symbolic representation. When the reordering of social ife or 
social values becomes excessive, representation comes to be plausible and 
identification becomes difficult or impossible (which is the reason why most 
of the Marquis de Sade fails as pornography) except for the manifestly 
pathological personality or we become unable to manage guilt and organise 
sexual tension. 
The point is, then, that without some direct purchase on 'the real world', such 
material, whether it be pornographic or violent, is likely to remain mar- 
ginalized and unpopular. However, the video market as a whole (and indeed 
local cinemas) still provides a vast range of material that concentrates onor 
combines erotic and violent hematology (see, for example, Dressed to Kill 
and When a Stranger Calls). Furthermore, some of the most popular videos in 
the United Kingdom at present 8,such as Policy Academy, Sudden Impact, The 
Good That Men Do and Once upon A Time In America all have a significant 
sexual and/or violent content. At the same time, the more 'moderate' versions 
of the 'nasties' are still available to the general public. Thus one national 
newspaper has carried a full page advertisement fora range of videos including 
Frauleins in Uniform ('Hitler's exy volunteer corp leave little to the imagina- 
tion') and Elsa Fraulein ('Hitler's love train for his Gestapo officers') 9. In 
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effect, then, the p articular extension of policing that is envisaged here is likely 
to be targeted at already marginalised sectors of the sexual landscape. Mean- 
while, mainstream aterial continues to display a very significant content of 
sexual and/or violent material 
ii) or are exaggerated forms or more special&t aspects of a more generally 
available and predominant mass culture. 
The Local Government Act can regulate the licencing of sex shops and other 
such acute concentrations of pleasure - for this seems to be precisely what hey 
are: concentrated or exaggerated versions of the set of taken-for-granted 
images, ideas and anticipations that have been disseminated throughout the 
commercial and cultural milieus of society: for the hard-porn sex shops, 
substitute the 'adult magazines' rack of the newsagents; for the peepshows 
substitute the 'special attraction' of some public houses - lunchtime strippers. 
Again, then, the availability of the more general, if more diluted, aspects of 
this culture, is likely to remain unaffected. 
iii) or have the effect of only increasing the allure of these more strongly policed 
areas. 
Some of the immediate consequences of the Indecent Displays Act were 
reported as follows: 
Soho's red-light area made a token retreat behind blacked-out windows 
simply labelled 'We Sell Offensive and Indecent Material' 
Sex shops can become xempt from the law simply by displaying a sign on 
the door saying that persons pässing beyond it would find material which 
they could consider indecent. This very notice was last night enticing extra 
business in Soho (The Guardian, 27 October 1981) 
And in newsagents and bookstores, the practical effect seems to have been to 
increase the distinction between the 'hard' and 'soft' markets. While ex- 
otically-clad models decorate the front covers of the latter, warnings are 
printed over the former (for example, 'not to be sold to under-18s'; 'keep out 
of the reach of children'; 'indecent material is contained inside'). Such warn- 
ings have an additional function: they add to the inducement topurchase this 
material by emphasising its 'special quality'. 
In effect, then, the consequences of repression may be to popularize, or to 
make more alluring, that which it is intended to repress. 
12 
Technological change, culture and modernity 
As these particular boundaries have been more tightly drawn, the acreages of 
what they allow and permit seem to have steadily increased, lndeed, one of the 
economic onsequences of Thatcherism - in coincidence with major tech- 
nological and media changes and transformations - has been the creation of a 
rauch greater space for the pursuit and enjoyment of individual hedonism. 
Technological acceleration, particularly in the areas of communication and 
information, and developments in the fields of cable, satellite, video and 
interactive media offer horizons that go far beyond the parameters of broad- 
cast television. And the degree of control (and the consequent implications for 
national broadcasting cultures) which either national legislatures or broadcast- 
ing institutions are able to exercise is brought sharply into question. And one 
of the consequences already is the opportunity given for the valorisation and 
economic development of leisure as a commodity. This is both pleasurable in
its own right and at the same time pedagogic in that it instructs viewers and 
listeners how to engage in such pleasures. This has led, on the one hand, to the 
cultivation and growth of private pleasures and entertainments: for example, 
the home video industry and the development ofcable television, offering the 
viewer far greater choice than before. And~, on the other, this combination of 
erotic, sexual and violent thematology has further colonised public space. It 
surveys an array of pleasures, titiUation and excitement toits audience at large: 
it constitutes an exhortation to indulge while also providing the building bricks 
for the development of a new economic infrastructure. At the heart of the 
modern city, the labour-intensive factory is replaced by leisure - freeing 
technologies: the uniformity of the factory worker by the opportunities for 
style and consumerism of the technocrat: 
the rise of the 'cultural industries' is a facet of economic hange. Jobs for 
actors, actresses, producers and all the ancillary functionaires substitute in 
the medium run for older, decayed manufacturing industries. Here is an 
area of economic specialisation where Britain does well. (The Times, 24 
February 1986) 
And it is possible to see how the topographical features of everyday life have 
been redrawn to take account of the availability and visibility of these socially 
ratified pleasures and pursuits. The prominent hemes of these contours 
include 
i) an emphasis on youth and the need to retain identifying characteristics of 
youth. 
Notwithstanding the regular negative and frightening images of British youth 
13 
(such as the football hooligan, the skinhead, see, for example, Mungham and 
Pearson 1976; Muncie 1984), there is another dimension to the issue of youth, 
another set of images that are available to us. These consist of positive and 
exhortary valorisations of 'youth' as the high point of enjoyment, pleasure and 
fulfilment 1°. Youth is seen as being at the forefront of economic and tech- 
nologieal change, which provides the means to achieve such desired end 
products: in this way, spectacular consumption replaces thrift as a social 
obligation in a technological, mass-production economy: 
'Hence greater affiuence has led not only to the emergence of new social 
groups, but to the spread of lifestyles and behaviour which fundamentally 
deny the legitimacy of the lifestyle and culture of the entrepreneurial 
middle-class . . .  Short-run hedonism has come to replace this worldly 
asceticism as the dominant value system of a mass-consumption society.' 
(Wallis 1976, p. 285) 
ii) instructions in the practice of individual hedonism. 
This can range from discourses related to 'the presentation ofself in everyday 
life' which offer instruction on and advise meticulous care in respect of 'going 
out', to the range of manuals centred around the issue of sexual performance 
and its improvement/diversity/regularity and so on (Featherstone 1982) 11. At 
the same time, the youth/pleasure n xus generates a pedagogy around the 
subject of how to retain and hang on to youthful attributes: how to continue to 
dress with style, to remain sexually active and adventurous, to remain fit and 
healthy and to cultivate and preserve the body and its associated pleasures (see 
Hepworth and Featherstone 1983). 
iii) the normalisation of the erotic 
The sofl-porn magazines milieu would seem to be a particularly good example 
here. Recent circulation trends (see Benn's Press Directory 1984) show a quite 
marked fall in overall sales from the high points they achieved in the late 
1970's. But if regular male readership (estimated at one in four of the United 
Kingdom population in the Williams Report 1978) has declined, the magazines 
still have a sufficient client base to serve as important educators and instructors 
of male opinions and attitudes on sexual matters. The decline is perhaps 
attributable~ to the effects of economic recession and the availability of other 
outlets for eroticism and titillation - such as the booming home video market 
(cf. Taylor 1985). However, what is particularly interesting here is the strategy 
whereby some of the United Kingdom based magazines 12have managed to 
hang on to or indeed have actually increased their sales and readership. As one 
of us has argued elsewhere (Pratt 1986), the way this has been achieved is to 
provide covers and contents which not only have alluring and titillating qual- 
14 
ities in their own right but which also emphasise the way in which some erotic 
dimension to everyday life is normal, almost banal. Within their pages the 
erotic is neither confined to secret hideaways nor is it made exotic - set in 
exclusive domains and settings uch as tropical shores and desert islands. 
Rather than this, the readers are informed, it can be located everywhere: 
around any corner, in any mundane location. 
As such, female bodies are displayed and situated in the world of laun- 
derettes, offices, libraries and so on. Similarly, the 'biographies' which ac- 
company the photographic content are full of references to 'ordinariness': uch 
as life in the office, going to clubs, keep-fit programmes 13.In effect, then, it is 
not by filling their pages with extraordinary contents that have, enabled them to 
sustain their popularity but the way in which they have provided afocus for the 
combination of the erotic and the normal. 
iv) a combination of adventure, stylisation, and irony in popular entertainments 
Again, we would like to illustrate this point by reference to developments in 
the popular media. If we look at developments in the television 'cop show' 
genre (particularly, for example, the very popular American serials Miami 
Vice and Cover Up) we find that although they observe some of its traditional 
features (see Reiner 1985), particularly in respect of the ultimate restoration of 
order by the intervention ofthe policeman-hero, at the same time they bring to 
it style, glamour and excitement. In contrast o their predecessors 14,these 
popular heroes are both vigorously masculine, dapper and youthful and 
simultaneously show integrity and strength that is underwritten, ot compro- 
mised, by their casually expensive clothes and laconic humour. As such, it is a 
form and style of policing, we contend, that accounts for their popularity, with 
its heroes et entirely within, indeed, made the centre point of this context of 
modernity. 
It is as if these programmes weave a fabric around real life: a fabric that is 
close to everyday reality and possibility (which makes it popular) but which at 
the same time is rather more than this - a kind of exaggerated and condensed 
representation f real life (which at the same time rescues it from pure banality 
and makes it all the more attractive). 
To come across these regular and interconnected features of modern life, it 
is important to note that we are not reduced to hunting out such examples from 
the recesses of the social body, as would have been the case some two or three 
decades ago. To look for pleasure and excitement, there is no need to venture 
into this twilight world. This particular venu.e still exists, of course, and indeed 
is probably policed more stringently as a result of the legislation of the last few 
years. But now, there is no longer any neßd to move beyond the parameters of
the normal to track down these allurements, nor is there any need to be furtive 
when seeking them out. Indeed, it seems at times that there is a positive 
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inducement toenjoy and celebrate these 'shining jewels' of consumer culture 
(cf. Foucault 1979). 
The moral career of a moral entrepreneur 
There is an irony, then, in the association between the New Right and the 
'authentic' voices of conservatism. This is exaccerbated bythe latest re-enact- 
ment of an entrenched discourse of moral decay and the prolifteration ofnew 
media which both excite reaction and yet whose underlying tendency is to 
subvert its programme. Nonetheless, their point of intersection i  the field of 
'law and order' retains considerable force both because it calls upon deeply felt 
and w~despread nxieties and because the generalities ofits proposition forbid 
disconfirmation. 
Accordingly, the ideas set out in the Disraeli Lecture speech of the Con- 
servative Party Deputy Leader are not new, but belong to a tradition which has 
regularly counter-posed the alleged ecay of modern society to a fictionalised 
point- some period sufficiently ong ago to be either beyond living memory or 
with the memory of only an older generation shocked into nostalgic yearnings 
for the past by the tumult of social change. In the present case, we have Mrs 
Thatcher's romantic dream of 'Victorian values'; in the chronology of Mrs 
Whitehouse and her supporting organisation, it seems to be the world that 
existed before television 'became available to all', that isl pre-1956: the point at 
which the hegemony ofthe BBC came to be challenged by the enfranchising of 
'commercial' television. Such analyses begin by drawing attention to social 
anxieties and the need for a reaffirmed social discipline - but then go on to 
elide all aspects of such crisis under a single head, representing them as a 
consequence of some feature of social cognition and disregarding the particu- 
lar features of the language, imagery and origin of the 'present crisis', as we see 
in the following editorial from a local paper: 
It was Winston Churchill who drew the attention of the British people to the 
need to stand up to an aggressor . . .  'or plunge forever into a new Dark 
Age.' The good fight was fought and won, but the new Dark Age has 
nevertheless descended upon us with the grim inevitability of predestined 
fate. 
Today on any T.V. news bulletin . . .  (Cambridgeshire Pride Magazine 
August 1985). 
It is important, in this respect, to pay attention to the centrality which is 
accorded, in the demonology of the moral Right, to the electronic media. 
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Certainly, it has not been lost on Mrs Whitehouse (not a number of those 
Conservative Party politicians now speaking out) that the change in the 
temper of the times, as experienced by certain sectors of society, is precisely 
contemporaneous with the arrival of television as a truly 'mass' medium: and it 
is as if there is some known association - whether as symptom or effective 
agent - between television and moral decay. 
In these respects, it is certainly not surprising that the Party which has been 
so attracted to 'law and order' postures in the past, should now be seeking 
some means of restoring its credentials by recourse to demanding the need for 
more social discipline. In this sense, it would seem to reflect a regrouping of 
the Right around a traditional rote - winning theme (cf. Taylor, 1 1981) while 
at the same time acting as a diversion from the failures and disastrous conse- 
quences of Thatcherism - which, inter alia, has brought rising crime and civil 
disturbances despite the law and order programme (Taylor 1986). But at the 
same time, the present campain is qualitatively very different from the pre- 
vious law and order rhetoric (which undoubtedly did have mass appeal, see 
Clarke and Taylor (1980). 
As such, it is not a campaign targetted around 'crime' i.e. summoning the 
resentment of the majority of the population against what are seen as the 
activities of a small but troublesome minority. On the contrary what gives it its 
specificity is that it is a campaign designed to remoralize society as a whole, 
with its starting point some of the most well received and popular aspects of 
contemporary culture. In effect, it is as if the whole thrust of modern society is 
moving in a very different direction (and has been given added impetus by the 
combination oftechnological development, the economics of Thatcherism and 
the ideology of the New Right) from the visions of social ife that Conservative 
fundamentalists adhere to. 
This becomes very apparent when we examine the position and perspective 
of Mary Whitehouse, the most prominent of these moral champions ~.
It is not a causal theory (the advent of mass television leads to moral and 
social decay) that she offers but a form of social criticism (a point overlooked, 
we feel, by some of her critics, see Murdock 1984; Gunter 1985). Her critique 
of the post-war world (centred mainly around the expansion of the television 
medium) is perhaps best understood as a common-sensical inflection of 'mass 
society' theory (Giner 1976; Bennett 1977). For what is common to the 
pessimisms loosely grouped under the heading of mass society theory is the 
belief that he modern age has relinquished orcompromised ultimate and basic 
values (religion, family, morality, discipline, hierarchy, etc.) with the likeli- 
hood of the dissolution of what had hitherto been a stable and orderly social 
body. 
What is at stake is not just the trauma in the transition from the Ge- 
meinschaft toGesellschaft ofsociological theory, but a battle at the last ditch 
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against what is seen as the continuing plunge into the barbarism of modernity: 
for Mrs Whitehouse and her supporters, 'discipline' becomes the only guaran- 
tor of liberty, the essential protector of a sane and orderly society from the 
plunge into a Hobbesian bellum omniurn contra omnes. It is as if 
the thin veneer of civilisation that has kept the brute within all of us at bay 
has been deliberately cracked and we are back in the eighteenth century 
(Caulfield 1975, p. 125). 
At the same time, the broadcasting companies (especially the BBC) are seen 
as being elitist, bureaucratic and almost by definition, 'out of touch' with 
'ordinary people' for whom, on the other hand, Mrs Whitehouse claims to 
represent (see Caulfield 1975, p. 132). As such television isseen as an imposi- 
tion, an invasion of the private domain and threat o family life: 
there is some strange dark force at work which protects the media. When the 
chips are down and the choice is between what people.. ,  call 'freedom' on 
the one hand and the 'welfare' of children and society on the other, then the 
intelligentsia, the opinion-formers, those responsible for film and televi- 
sion, close ranks and defend their own highly specialised version of 'free- 
dom'. Why, why, why? Is it money? Is it intellectual pride and an au- 
thoritarianism- that cannot brook contradiction? Or is it, as in some cases it 
most surely is - a commitment to cultural and political anarchy? Otherwise, 
how does it come about hat minds are so closed and intellectual integrity so 
prostituted? (Whitehouse 1978, p. 15). 
Yet, by the same token, a peculiar sense of desertion attaches to the fear that 
the master institutions of cultural continuity and certainty have, as it were, 
'gone over' to the tide of modernity, of scepticism, of the heterogeneity of 
belief and experience. It is not that the discourse of Mrs Whitehouse, for 
example, represents he voice of a populist moral politics, but instead it is a 
discourse that has become marginal in its dissent - raging impotently against 
the television institutions, when this use of the medium is in the process of 
being surpassed by a range of new technological nd media developments. 
Given this, if those on the New Right are to continue to try and effect some 
combination with the traditionalists and fundamentalists of the Right, then it 
would not only form an important contradiction within Thatcherite politics 
and ideology, but at the same time would take the New Right down a route 
which some of its erstwhile supporters such as the Police Federation have 
specifically warned against: 
Be careful not to confuse acceptance of violence with 'declining standards of
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morality', particularly sexual morality .. .  The Federation would be in 
danger of alienating support. . ,  if it tried to equate support for public order 
with an overly conventional view of sexual or other personal morality. It 
would be right to stress the value of the family and family togetherness and a 
respect for conventional discipline as a support for combating crime, but, for 
younger people, this does not entail what they might conceive of as a 
repressive attitude to freedom in personal behaviour (Police March 1976). 
More recently, The Times newspaper, now one of the leading media trumpe- 
ters of New Right orthodoxy, recognised the contradiction ofsuch a posture in 
an important editorial: 
•.. what is disconcerting is to see Mrs Whitehouse joined in her campaign by 
Conservatives - including the Prime Minister herself, apparently unaware 
of the discrepancy between their espousal of market individualism and their 
enthusiasm for heavy-handed policemen agents of the State, interposing 
themselves between individual consumers and broadcast material• 
What a signal to give the nation. To bring the State with its apparatus of 
censorship into stage, street, gallery, even the daily newspaper, because it
knows better than parents when and in what way the young are to be 
protected. (The Times 24 February 1986). 
In effect, Mrs Whitehouse and her associates are unwelcome guests for the 
true believers of the New Right. Essentially, the latter have a vision and plan 
of the future: Mrs Whitehouse, our examplar, remains locked into the past. 
Equally, the belligerent posture of defence that she and various other moral 
entrepreneurs have seen as necessary only adds to their social marginality and 
isolation. Their attack takes the form of constantly describing, assessing, 
denouncing the content and supposed impact of television16: as such, it is a 
process of bearing witfiess to the present from the point of view of a reaching 
back into the past. However, if in Mrs Whitehouse's historiography ofmodern 
culture, the crucial date was 1956 ('mass television') then it is also clear that for 
most young people her attempt to rekindle up and hold on to fleeting limpses 
of a past which did not contain such possibilities has no grounding in reality. 
Yet all the time that this conjuring takes place, so the sense of dislocation from 
the present increases - both in terms of being able to speak to a public that 
might share such views, and also in respect of continuing technological 
changes that make the present even more unacceptable. 
Certainly, Mrs Whitehouse and people like her no longer feel at home in this 
modern society, nor are things likely to improve for them. But, in one sense 
their anger and distress have not been misdirected, for in speaking out against 
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television, they have located not only the acme of the first industrial revolu- 
tion, but the horizon of the second. 
The ship of fools 
We have referred to the writing and campaigning of Mrs Mary Whitehouse 
and the National Viewers and Listeners Association since we see them as 
being the prime example of the marginalisation f the moral Right. Their work 
and that of similar British organisations ( uch as the Responsible Society and 
the Middle Class Society) represents not so much a serious threat o liberal 
values as a desperate attempt to retrieve and direct he movement of history as 
it drifts away from them and taust be understood as such. And just as this 
political constituency has become increasingly marginalised so too, it seems to 
us, have the legislative changes introduced uring Mrs Thatcher's tenancy of 
government, been directed at the margins of contemporary culture. Within the 
boundaries of what is permissible, all the indications are that there will be a 
continuation and expansion of a general incitement to engage in pleasures and 
indulgencies. This seems to us to be an embedded and inevitable feature of life 
in modern Western societies: we see the growth of an enormous leisure space 
with an expanding and far-ranging economic fabric woven around it: and allied 
to media and technological dvances, it is made all the more alluring and 
attractive. 
Against this, Mrs Whitehouse in our view, represents par excellence a
collection of voices and anxieties from what has become a redundant moral 
category within the modern social body: consisting of all those, whether on the 
grounds of age, conflicting moral purviews, or whatever, find themselves 
increasingly left out or under threat from the combination of effects and 
pleasure-giving produce of the increasingly mediated and technologised so- 
ciety. 
If such developments do indeed constitute the beginnings of a second 
industrial revolution, then it seems likely that, just as in the first industrial 
revolution, there are going to be a range of social casualities. One group can be 
seen most vividly in most northern cities in the United Kingdom: great 
regiments of unemployed men and women who, whet.her on account of their 
lack of the requisite skills an d training, their age or capability, have been made 
economically redundant. But, by the nature of this second revolution, there 
also seems to be another collection of individuals - a redundant moral cate- 
gory. 
From which part of the social body is this conglomeration f voices coming 
from? Far removed from its fulcrum, it would seem. More likely, some tightly 
barricaded corner that is energetically defended. And yet in spite of their 
20 
vigorous defences, the contingent of moral entrepreneurs still find that they 
are pushed back beyond the margins of society and are cut oft from its 
moorings. Adrift, they have begun a navigation without end, for it is the past 
that they wish to be their destination. And perhaps what those of us left 
standing on the United Kingdom shoreline can see is the modern-day equiva- 
lent of the medieval Ship of Fools floating out to sea (cf. Foucault 1967). The 
difference lies in its crew: it is no longer populated by madmen, but instead by 
despairing, but self righteous moral entrepreneurs, identifying the terrain they 
are sailing away from as the cause of their hopelessness. 
From the shore we can hear their crying, shouting and bewailing: indeed, it 
is possible to discern the rhythym of liturgical chanting at times, such as the 
following example, taken from an editorial in the English Daily Express, the 
traditional media representative of this political constituency and itself in 
serious decline: 
We know that the permissive society is not the civilized society.. .  
That evil is growing and must be fought. . .  
Maybe there is something in a comparatively affluent society, long at peace, 
which produces its own mindless brutality .. .  
Abandonment ofsound moral values is itself a cause of our present woes. . .  
(Daily Express 14 March 1986). 
But despite their frantic attempts to attract our attention before all is lost, this 
collection of individuals and organizations are themselves set on the course of 
a sea crossing that can never come to an end. As the social contours and 
landmarks of the United Kingdom become roded and less familiar, so do 
their voices become louder and shriller - and more incoherent v.
Notes 
1. We would like to acknowledge the comments made by an external reviewer in respect of this 
particular point. 
2. Although in contrast o their argument, we take the view that the popular appeal and 
development of the New Right are not phenomena that can be generalized on an international 
basis. 
3. For more biographical details of this person and her background see, for example, Tracey and 
Morrison (1973); Caulfield (1975) 
4. See, for example, Daily Mail, 14 November 1985; The Sunday Times, 8 December 1985; The 
Times, 31 January 1986; The Guardian, 9 December 1985; Feedback, BBC Radio 4, 15 
February 1986; This Week, Next Week, BBC 1, 23 February 1986. 
5. For more detailed review, see Taylor (1985). 
6. The specific materials to be controlled are defined as 'moving pictures, by whatever means 
produced, which - 
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a) are concerned primarily with the portrayal of, or primarily deal with or relate to, or are 
intended to stimulate or encourage - 
i] sexual activity; or 
ii] acts of force or restraint which are associated with sexual activity; or 
b) are concerned primarily with the portrayal of, or primarily deal with or relate to, genital 
organs or urinary or excretory functions' 
(Schedule 3, section 3, p.68). 
7. This distinction between the public and the private domains in relation to sexual practices was 
set out in Wollenden (1957). 
8. Source: Video World, March 1986. 
9. See The Star, 8 February 1986. 
10. Empirically, 'youth' seems to range from 18-35. These are the age limits specified in the 
following advertisement, which adresses one of the most significant developments in British 
and other consumer cultures: the exotic 'holiday abroad'. Thus: 
You and Me and Buddies... bid you welcome to the eighties-style way to holiday- fun and 
laughter in the exotic and homely places. Beaches and booze. Blokes and birds. Music and 
wirte. Hot spots day and night. It's about day times crowded with activity and sunshine. 
New experiences - surf sailing, skiing, paragliding, horse-riding, o-carting, or simple lazy 
daze tanning. About night times of discos, night clubs, bars and taverns 
Some people come in groups, some in pairs, some come solo. Any way they come, they 
come to relax, liven up, mix and mingle. And sorne come to meet someone special. And 
when the mixing and mingling is done, to get away somewhere quiet and discover each 
other . . .  (Cosrnopolitan February 1981) 
11. There are numerous examples from the popular press that we could draw on here. Amongst 
the most typical was the series on 'the British Way of Love' which ran for a week in The Sun, 
the most popular British daily paper, from 28 April 1980, and which pursues an editorial line 
strongly in support of the New Right. 
12. These magazines are respectively Fiesta, Mayfair and Knave. 
13. As an example, Mayfair 18(5), 1984 contained a set of photographs accompanied by the 
following 'biography': 
When pert-breasted 19 year old Susie told us that she worked as a secretary, we weren't very 
surprised. Her 34-23-35 figure would enhance any office. But when she added that she 
would like to be photographed where she actually works, we found the idea so unusual that 
we had to take her up on it. Consequently at 5 a.m. one chilly day, Susie and the 
photographer could be seen by early risers letting themselves into the ultra-modern block in 
the Milton Keynes where she is more often typing.. .  Once in the third floor office Susie 
really came into her own, posing behind her desk in the clothes he wears every day to work. 
'I loved every minute', she told us after the session. 'I only wish I could have done it during 
the day. But I don't think Head Office would have approved ... 
14. Such as the socially marginal and eccentric heroes of the 1970s - 'Cannon', 'Rockford', 
'Kojak' and 'Columbo' (all from American television series). Moreover, the introductory 
sequence to, say Miami Vice places their heroes in the modern context. The viewer is drawn 
into a perspective of the local waterfront from the vantage point of a vertiginously speeding 
helicopter. This image is cross-cut with others of speed and energy and urbane pleasure, horse 
- racing, dog-racing, pelota, wind-surfing and a brief but lascivious alighting on women 
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sunbathing orstrolling in bikinis. A frenetic sound-track underpins the imprcssion of the pace 
and available pleasures of a leisured, moneyed, sexualised life. The use of popular songs as 
incidental music, provides for the instantaneous recognition and emphasis of moments of 
pleasure or poignancy. The programme seems to have learned the force of the concentration 
of the flow of images from the production of the promotional rock v ideo. . .  
15. One of the most popular and prominent hard porno magazines in Britain in the 1970s was 
Whitehouse, a deliberately chosen name. This shows, interalia, the way in which the cam- 
paigning of Mary Whitehouse actually had the effect of popularizing such material. 
16. One only has to read to output of N.V.A.L.A. publications to see the meticulous checking 
that takes place. One episode of Streets of San Francisco (another American produc- 
tion)provoked the following comments: 
Liquor store robbery. Shooting by police and robbers. 'Bad' character badly injured. He 
dies. Police officer hit by van driven at hirn by robber. Liquor store owner also injured, then 
dies. Man crashes van. Fires three times at police officers. He is killed by shot fired by 
uniformed policeman. Girl fires revolver twice at police officer. Misses hirn, then runs 
away. Girl fires six shots at some police officer but misses him. He disarms her. Modern 
setting. Explicit violence. (from Seven Days Violence: a one-week survey of violence in 
television programmes, N.V.A.L.A. publications, 1985). 
17. Witness the astonishment and embarrassment wi h which Mfs Whitehouse was greeted by 
other panellists on the BBCs 'This Week, Next Week' (25 February 1986) when in the course 
of a discussion on Mr Churchill's Bill (v.s.) which focussed largely on the 'graphic' violence of 
two films shown late at night on Independent Television Channel 4, she began to talk about 
the morality of the 'East Enders' soap opera, currently the most popular programme on 
British television. 
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